568. The Last Generation of the Roman Republic by Erich S. Gruen. Gruen rejects the approach “to read the past in light of the Civil War.” He does more than this. He sets forth a direct challenge to conventional history of the Roman Republic. He asserts that there was no breakdown or collapse or moral decline which accounts for the fall of the Republic. He most assuredly must have ruffled feathers. I do not see how anyone can cover the history of the late Republic without dealing with this work somehow. Here is a brief summary.
His history begins with Lucius Cornelius Sulla’s Dictatorship. He condemns his method of proscriptions and cruelty. He also looks at his settlement. He enlarged the Senate and drew largely from the Equestrian class. Jury selection now came from members of the Senate. Since the Equestrian class was present in large numbers, there was no longer a major source of contention. The Italian franchise, a result of the Social War, made Italians more loyal to Rome. The cursus honorum was more carefully defined. The election to the Quaestorship automatically made one a member of the Senate. This made sure that by the time an army was commanded or a province governed that traditions had been absorbed. The power of the Tribunate was diminished. Tribunes retained right of ius auxilii but legislation initiatives were limited or abolished, tribunicia potestas modified and higher offices were closed to holders of the Tribunate. These made the Tribunate a tool of the ruling class. Thus politicians would look to traditional patterns. Leaders and groups which caused dissension were brought into the governing class would wish to preserve and not destroy the political system. Sulla did not want to stop political fighting. He wanted it directed to the use of the state. Sulla did not want a system which would not allow change.
Sulla died in 78. Most historians viewed this as signal to begin dismantling of his settlement. Gruen sees it otherwise. New Consuls were elected: M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catullus. Lepidus saw an opportunity to strengthen his political base. He set in motion effort to recall those exiled by Sulla, repeal Sullan decrees, restore political status to those punished by Sulla and restore their property. The matter brought unity to Senate policy and Lepidus, who soon turned to armed revolt, was crushed. The ruling class closed ranks. Disputes were temporarily set aside. Gruen does not see this as sign of weakness of the Sullan system but as a system which met a crisis successfully.
Restoration of Tribunician power is usually seen as death blow to Sullan system. Here is Gruen's view. Tribunate restrictions were modified as ruling class saw it as non threatening. M. Aurelius Cotta, consul in 74 sponsored a bill to remove the dead end restriction. Cotta was from the heart of the ruling class. In early 70’s there was push for revival of full Tribunician powers. This was successfully resisted. After the Senate successfully dealt with Sertorius and other difficulties, in 71 there was a renewed push for restoration and the measure saw no resistance.
Jury selection is usually viewed as another means by which the Sullan system was overturned. But the Lex Aurelia which put tribuni aerarii and equites on juries was sponsored from within the oligarchy. The very people who were supporters of Sulla. Do not forget many equestrians were already in the Senate. The number of court cases may have been large. Thus a larger pool of jury members was needed.
The Sullan oligarchy never was a monolith. Families and family groups were constantly jockeying for position. This is an important part of the Sullan settlement. It allowed a means by which competition and friction could be directed for the benefit of the state. ( Is that not the function of our own Constitution?) As the 70’s wore on, confidence in the system increased as old and new family feuds surfaced. Adjustment not breakdown was the hallmark of the 70’s.
For generations noble houses struggled with each other for supremacy via marriage, amicitiae and clientelae. Now there was a new dimension. There were more plebs, more active business, more mobile social structure. These produced speedier and more frequent realignments. What did this produce? A tension between the old way and new elements. Splintering within families, alliances and groups. More complexity but structured patterns exist. Gruen uses this to demolish the idea of a senatorial party. With this Gruen suggests that many modern scholars do not really understand Roman republican political system. The Romans would not have understood our term Senatorial party.
The following principes were in alliance in the 60’s: Q. Lutatius Catullus, L. Licinius Lucullus and Q. Hortensius. As these faded the slack was taken up by Marcus Porcius Cato and his group who were closely connected with the first three.
Another factor forced realignment of families: Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. He desired traditional position via alliance. This was the single most important factor in scrambling older senatorial loyalties. Pompey was married to Sulla’s stepdaughter. Later he married Metelli Marcia whose family was connected to Sulla. In his bid for command against Mithradates Pompey was supported by a host of former consuls. On his staff were 2 Lentuli, 2 Manlii Torquati, 2 Metelli, Claudius Nero, Aemilius Scaurus, Cornelius Sulla, Valerius Flaccus, Pupius Piso, Octavius Plautius Hypsaeus. This list makes it clear that association with Pompey counted more than family ties or faction. It represents a splitting of families and family groups. Pompey reached out to families of lower levels. When he eliminated pirates, he probably gained support of moneyed interests. Many members of the ruling class feared all of this as threat to the established order. However remember that Pompey was doing what any noble would do: jockey for position of prominence or supremacy. This act as always produced a realignment of families to prevent that.
Pompey’s massing of families, grants of citizenship during his military commissions, wealth, clientelae, provincial commands, his eastern settlements without consent of senatorial embassy created resistance. He overextended himself. His political connections were so extensive and complex that holding these in balance eventually would become impossible.
The fragmented aristocracy created opportunities for Marcus Licinius Crassus. He used money as a means to power but himself lived simply. He was a force to be reckoned with. He was accused of complicity in the Catilinarian Conspiracy. His accuser was immediately arrested. For there were two concerns. If Crassus was forced to defend himself on the side of the conspirators, this would give protection to the conspiracy. Also no one wished to experience his wrath. In examining Crassus scholars often allow Carrhae to obscure his military achievements. He did not rest his authority on popular programs. He kept his faction smaller. When Sulla increased the size of the Senate, Crassus may have seen the Pedarii as a basis of power. The Pedarii were those senators who expressed their sentiments by walking to the side they supported. He did not build his base on traditional lines.
C. Julius Caesar, obsessed with his dignitas had close contact with Marians and with Sullans. As Pompey rose to prominence Caesar advanced his career by attaching himself to followers of Pompey. This may account for Caesar’s success for election to Pontifex Maximus. Pompey lent his support out of hostility to Q. Lutatius Catullus (who also ran for the position). Pompey’s new group produced resistance from other family groups. One of which was that of Catullus.
The reaction to the first Triumvirate. Pompey appeared to be riding the crest of a wave. He returns from his successes in the East. Cato and his group mount an offensive. Pompey divorces Marcia in hopes of expanding his links and offers himself to Cato’s niece. Cato rejects. Pompey sought approval for settlements in east. Denied. He sought right to triumph. Delayed. Caesar, connected to Pompey returns from Spain in 60. He too is rebuffed. This is the occasion for the formation of what is called the First Triumvirate. Gruen asserts that this term is incorrect. It was a traditional amicitiae. Each united for personal reasons. There was no sense of permanency. Caesar had a package of bills. Normal procedure was to submit bills to Senate for packaging and then sent to comitia for voting. Cato’s group makes this impossible. Caesar presents bills directly to the people. Caesar’s bills are passed using dubious tactics. Caesar’s colleague in office, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, uses religion to declare all of Caesar’s law invalid. This too is ignored. Pompey loses more than any of the three. What he wanted more than anything was noble support. This he loses big time.
Cato’s attacks on the triumvirate opened avenue for other aristocratic groups to realign. Pompey to restore his position issues a threat to Caesar. He sees his position of political primacy slipping away. Pompey announces that his partisans were planning to challenge Caesar’s agrarian law of 59. At the same time Domitius Ahenobarbus, ally of Cato, announces his candidacy for consulship. His plan was to replace Caesar in Gaul. This produces the Conference at Luca in 56. The three plan to combine again their resources to elect Pompey and Crassus consuls for 55, acquire new command for Pompey, command for Crassus and renewal of Caesar’s tenure in Gaul. The renewed vigor of the “Triumvirate’ again produces aristocratic opposition. The success of Pompey/Caesar/Crassus produces fragmentation. By this I mean old political alliances break up and new ones form or other combinations are made.
It is important not to think that there were two groups: military dynasts and defenders of the republic. This can not stand up against the fact that “expanding concentric circles of families brought in groups which strained the unity of the center. While engaging in politics as usual, the nobiles unwittingly but effectively transformed the traditional basis of political cooperation.”
Gruen says that the following principle cemented the ruling class: leadership and responsibility devolve upon an elite distinguished by generations of public service. In the last generation of the Republic this remained unchanged. Illustrious families continued to be elected. Out of 20 consuls in the 70’s, 17 had connections with Sulla. No change is evident in the 60’s. It is clear that Pompey in the 60’s did not dictate elections. The populace elected people of family and prestige. This does not mean that fighting and quarrels did not happen. That was the nature of the Roman political system. At the same time it is not possible to divide into Pompeian and antipompeian candidates.
(It was not part of his purpose but while reading Gruen’s description of Cicero’s bid for the consulship, I could not help but think that Cicero was forging a political base unlike that of Pompey, Caesar or Crassus. Food for thought.)
Here is the evidence to demonstrate this point. Caesar in his bid for the consulship was sponsored by Pompey. BUT M. Calpurnius Bibulus, supported by Cato and C. Piso, was elected too. Then in 59 Caesar married Calpurnia, the daughter of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus. Triumvirs could not control election. A conservative electorate elected candidates from traditional ruling class. True Pompey saw to election of his friend, Gabinius, but illustrious families usually were elected. Under extreme pressure the three strengthened their position at Luca for 55. But again they were not able to control elections for 54. Too often modern histories make it seem as though the triumvirs did pretty much what they pleased and with only token opposition. This scenario simply does not hold up.
In 53 M. Valerius Messala Rufus and Cn. Domitius Calvinus were consuls. Disturbances had caused election to be delayed 'til July, almost a full year behind schedule. Immediately upon election, these consuls had to hold elections for the following year. T. Annius Milo was candidate supported by Cicero, Cato. P. Plautius Hypsaeus supported by Pompey. Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica not just from an illustrious family but from illustrious families. The presiding consuls lost control. There were riots, street fights. Elections were postponed. January 18, Milo killed Clodius (this is the one who caused Cicero’s exile). Supporters of Clodius burned the Senate house. Finally the Senate passed the Senatus consultum ultimum. The interrex, tribunes and Pompey (he had imperium) were instructed to restore order. Elections were canceled. M. Calpurnius Bibulus, family group of Cato, moved that Pompey be sole consul and that at end of two months after taking office he must chose a colleague. This guy hated Pompey. But resotring order was more important than political quarrels. This also does not, Gruen says, indicate union of Cato and Pompey against Caesar. Order had to be restored and Pompey had imperium. Pompey again tried to enter circle of Cato and was rebuffed. Pompey married Cornelia, daughter of Metellus who was hostile to Cato. This was Pompey’s program for 3 decades- alliance with nobiles. Pompey chose Metellus as his colleague. Both resigned on time. Gruen depicts this as a crisis met by flexibility of Roman constitution.
Elections for 51, 50 and 49 were normal and traditional candidates returned. Most were hostile to Caesar and or Pompey. The list does not indicate electoral concern over “clash of war”. Instead confidence in tradition.
( My point for students reading this is to realize that history is not simple. It requires great knowledge and a willingness to challenge accepted traditional interpretation. This does not mean that everything Gruen says is correct- but he lays down a challenge which no quality historian can ignore.)
The Roman Senate had a strong sense of ascending dignitas. Consulares spoke first, then Praetors, etc. The Senate was not bogged down with a seniority system. Aging quaestors did not accumulate auctoritas. Prestige was linked to continued elective office. Was there a change in social status or composition in the Ciceronian age?
Election to the Praetorship, which possessed imperium, did not require consular ancestry. But 1/2 of praetors for this period came from consular families. The next best credentials for election were ancestors who had been elected to the Praetorship. This non consular group rarely saw someone elected to the consulship. Only three exceptions for this period. Keep in mind that this continued even though Sulla increased the number of Praetors from 6 to 8.
48 of 120 Aediles are known for this period. 40% came from consular families. And this office was not part of cursus honorum. Many nobiles avoided it. It simply was not needed for them.
Tribunate was not part of cursus honorum. Patricians were not eligible. With 10 positions per year, did this open door to lesser families?. 113 of 300 tribunes for this period are known. The proportion of those from consular families, senatorial and novi homines are not the same as for the above offices. But not much different. The Tribunate was closed to patricians but plebeian nobiles represent 33% of the group.
The Pedarii had the lowest esteem in the Senate. They voiced their opinions by walking to the side they supported. There were after Sulla 600 Senators. 20 Quaestors per year kept it at that number. Censors could add or subtract that number. Evidence indicates that senators from consular families remained pedarii until age permitted advancement. The equestrian class was a source. People from municipia, consular families and senatorial. Sulla’s enlargement prevented petrification. “The traditional structuring gained a broader perspective and firmer stability.”
Did the nobility overlook or neglect abuses? Did they narrow themselves into a tight and irresponsible oligarchy? Did they yield the initiative to demagogues? Military leaders? Did they forfeit respect? Seal their own doom? The image of hard bound conservatives reacting against every suggestion for change does not correspond to the evidence. Common charges against the Senate:
corruption in elections
inequities in judiciary
unwilling to make administrative or institutional changes
inability to maintain internal order.
Around 120 a quaestio de amibtu ( a court to deal with corrupt election practices) was set up. Sulla sharpened penalty- 10 year prohibition from office for conviction. In 67 C. Cornelius ( supported by Pompey), tribune, proposed ambitus bill. So did the Consul, Calpurnius Piso (supported by Lucullus, Hortensius, Bibulus). Piso opposed Pompey, not the idea of the bill itself. There was always jockeying to see who would get credit for a law. The final law was Lex Calpurnia. This was a sweeping law. The change came from the heart of the aristocracy. ( The real bone of contention with revision of our Social Security system here in the United States is not whether or not the system needs fixed for that is obvious but who will get credit.)
Violence was not new to the Republic. But the late Republic dealt with it more directly than any previous generation. In 55 (Crassus and Pompey consulship) a law was passed to ban sodales- people who bribed voters and other such illegal activities. It appears that the Senate tread carefully here for they did not want to civil liberties.
Pompey's laws of 52 revised leges de vi (violence) and de ambitu (electoral corruption). To make a conspicuous display of government authority Pompey proposed and passed the establishment of a quaestio extraordinaria. This law de vi provided for:
advocates (lawyers) reduced in number
limit on time for speeches
written testimony from absent advocates banned
as well as laudatory orations
limit of 5 days
This law was temporary. To deal with an immediate crisis.
Lex Pompeia de ambitu had a long life. It brought sweeping changes in jury selection for this offense. A sortition produced 81 jurors. Challenges were permitted on a limited basis. 51 were left to serve on jury.
Caesar’s Lex Julia repetundarum (deals with corrupt practices of a governor) had over 100 clauses; rigorous limits to expenses, strict accounting, financial records must be placed in two cities in the province and a duplicate sent to Rome, documents must be sealed to prevent falsification.... Very extensive. Caesar’s methods may be questioned but his legislative activity tells a different story.
Here is an interesting case. Lex Pompeia de parricidiis (parricide) perhaps passed in 55 was probably a step toward greater precision. No contemporary source mentions this law. Why? Not a matter of political contention. Thus modern historians pass over it. “This typifies the tendency to concentrate on the fleeting events and neglect the more enduring enactment's of the late Republic.” Gruen adds an interesting comment. Criminal statutes in almost every case originated in the curia i.e., the Senate House, not in the mind of some radical..
59, 58, 55, 52 are years often looked at as examples of decay. Yet these are the years which produced solid legislation aimed at stability and progressive reform.
“In the past mos maiorum had sufficed to keep regulation to a minimum. But with adjustments made to changes in family alignment and incorporation of much wider political base due to extension of citizenship, law stepped in to pick up the slack. Thus a stream of new leges. This created a less flexible structure, less freedom for movement. The structure was tighter but more brittle. Roman statesmen on the whole sincere and assiduous in attacking contemporary problems. But the means employed, a proliferation of statutory law, may have contributed to the Republic’s undoing.” It may be that the late Republic made too many laws which hampered ability to move or adapt to the circumstances.
Criminal trials reveal much about how competition was worked out. Why have trials? It is an opportunity to display talent, work out rivalries, deal with larger issues, means to embarrass political opponents, settle private feuds. Pompey’s supporters were taken to court and his group prosecuted members of other opposing groups. Do not let this mislead. One example will suffice.
In 65 Cornelius was charged de maiestate. In 67 Cornelius a tribune with Pompey’s support presented a bill concerning amibtus. He was opposed by the Consul Piso who also proposed a bill on ambitus. There was a scuffle, riots broke out and too boot Cornelius had ignored the veto of another Tribune. Now in the end Piso’s version prevailed. In 65 Cornelius was charged de maiestate ( a complex term- he was charged sort of with damaging the Republic’s dignity). Politics was the central issue. Witnesses for the prosecution: Catullus, Hortensius, Lucullus, Piso, etc. Cicero defended (with support of Pompey). Cicero had an ace up his sleeve. The defending witness was P. Servilius Globulus, the tribune whose veto Cornelius ignored. Cornelius was acquitted. Jurors rendered verdict based on the merits of the case. This story sums up much of what has been written so far. Also important to note that hostilities (most of the time) were carried out in court, not the streets.
Here is another example. Sulla’s adherents inflicted brutality and confiscation on those who lost the fight against Sulla. In the 60’s there was a movement to restore bounty taken by Sullans, punish executioners, bring back political exiles, reinstate rights of those proscribed. These were legitimate claims. But legitimate claims can also be exploited by shrewd politicians. On example will suffice. Faustus Sulla, son of Sulla, charged with possession of property taken by his father belonging to the state. Faustus was close to Pompey. He was not condemned. M. Lucullus was prosecuted for embezzlement of state funds during time of Sulla. His prosecutor was an associate of Pompey. He was not condemned either. This represents political retaliation.
Gruen uses the trial during this period to show how feuds, competition, and issues were worked out. But he also uses these to show how much punch the oppositions had. Note that I use the plural. It was not senatorial versus Triumvirs. When the conference at Luca ended and opponents found out about it, a reaction set in. Numerous members of the Triumvirs associates were hauled into court. These also show the tenacity of convention.
What about Plebs and the army? The plebs were not a block. They were fragmented because their attachments were to individual and family groups. In fact pleb enrollment in the army may have been an agent for stability. There were mutinies, true. But most of these belong to the Social Wars and Civil Wars. There are no defections to the enemies of Rome. Plebs were not interested in revolution. In fact they had an interest in stability. It is retroactive thinking to label soldiers as Caesarian or Pompeian. Of course after 4 years of Civil War soldiers would have viewed matters this way. But not in December of 50. Pompey had difficulty recruiting soldiers. A majority wanted a settlement between the antagonists. Each soldier took an oath (sacramentum) before their commander. Some modern scholars say that this oath bound the soldier to that commander. In this oath the soldier said that he would not retire until service was completed by order of the Consul. Thus ultimate authority resided in the civil government and it representatives. It appears that after service and a veteran received a land grant, they were not heard of again. When Civil War erupted in 49, Pompey asked his former military soldiers in Campania to enlist. They were decidedly unenthusiastic. The idea of clientele armies comes in for a blow too. These made up small contingencies of the whole army. Often used to supplement. The idea of professional armies comes into view too. True there were professional armies abroad but personnel was not permanent. By this I mean that the army as a unit was permanent but soldiers’ terms would expire and they would go home to be replaced by a new recruit. Professional military men are a misnomer too. It is true that military expertise existed. But these rose steadily through the political ladder. They evidently did not view themselves as professional soldiers. They “did not abandon the forum for the camps.” Many sought office at end of term of service. Gruen gives a raft of examples.
Was there a discontented group which anxiously waited for a leader? Apparently not. Plebs had numerous means to express feelings at the theater, circus, political events, public meetings. They were also fragmented. There were patron benefactors. Probably no freeborn people were in the army of Spartacus. No slaves from the city joined. Many slaves would not have been interested due to possibility of freedom. Rural slaves were a different matter but there was no way for them to organize. Plus the incentive to revolt was little to none and the ability was nonexistent. A movement to restore victims of Sulla to magisterial office was raised in 63. Cicero opposed the measure on the grounds that it was not wise to rock the boat. It is interesting that the measure was rejected by the populace. This is clear evidence that the victims of Sulla were not a significant pressure group.
The conspiracy of Catiline was not a revolution. What they wanted was power, political power in the tradition of the past. Gruen says that support for the conspiracy came from those whose needs would have been met by a bill proposed by Rullus, tribune. This was opposed by Cicero. Gruen says that but for this the conspiracy could have been avoided. A very interesting idea.
Urban violence existed from very early days. The main reason is a lack of a police force. Not because the Romans were too stupid to realize the need but they realized that in the wrong hands social problems could get worse. Besides Romans considered private force a legitimate means to express grievances. Urban plebs was not a monolith. It comprised freedmen, shopkeepers, craftsmen, professionals, laborers, displaced farmers, poor. Common action was rare. But grain deficiencies could force it. There was a grain shortage in 67. Due to pirates. Gabinius proposed that Pompey be given control over grain shipments. The Senate objected. Gabinius was even manhandled. At that point the plebs attacked the curia. They wanted action and they needed it now. Piso, consul, continued opposition to the bill anyway. He was nearly killed. Senators fled. The bill passed. The plebs knew what they needed to do. After Pompey was appointed, grain prices fell. Plebs were happy. The Civil War in 49 did not arise from pleb discontent. In fact Gruen gives several examples of how restrained and intelligent the plebs acted. Yes, there was violence, even unrestrained at times. But this is characteristic of any society.
The Coming of Civil War
“The writing of history is forever plagued by the temptation of hindsight.”
Ancient view: the power of Caesar was a source of suspicion to Pompey and Pompey’s dignitas was a serious concern to Caesar. This is pretty much the modern view. Lets see what Gruen says.
In 55 Pompey/Crassus gain extension for Caesar in Gaul. Pompey is governor of Spains. Pompey used legates to handle matters in Spains. He stayed near Rome. There is nothing to suggest that Caesar was displeased. In 54 both Pompey and Caesar supported same candidates for Consulship. Caesar supports Pompey’s defense of Gabinius. Caesar showed no displeasure at talk of Pompey being elected dictator during crisis which lead to events of 52. When Caesar needed more troops, Pompey sent a legion of his own. There is no change in 53. In 59 Caesar had made Pompey his principal heir. When Julia (Caesar’s daughter), Pompey’s wife, died in 54, the will was unchanged. The will remained unchanged until the Civil War. Crassus died in 53. Pompey’s sole consulship came in 52 and this in fact would have been pleasing to Caesar. Caesar and Pompey had not been too successful in getting people into high places. In 52 Pompey married the daughter of Metellus. His son married daughter of Appius. This connection would have pleased Caesar. This is what they had hoped to achieve several times in the past: access into the heart of the aristocracy. Caesar asked for exemption from professio (This required a candidate to be present in person in order to run for offfice.). Pompey worked for this. Caesar was given the exemption from the professio. Then comes the Lex Pompeia de iure magistratuum. This has been used by moderns to claim that Pompey turned his back on the earlier law (about professio). Gruen suggests that the previous bill generated confusion. This new bill made requirements clear. Then comes the Lex Pompeia de provinciis. Did this undermine Caesar? This law required a five year gap between office and governorship. Does it make sense that Pompey would pass a law releasing Caesar from professio and then pass a law making that law meaningless? The idea anyway was not new. It had been suggested in 53, as a means to reduce corruption. In fact Gruen suggests that this may be the first sign that Rome began to look on a province as something more than a by product of holding office. This law was not retroactive. Pompey had his own tenure in the Spains to think of. Both Pompey’s position and Caesar’s were granted by a vote of the people and were out side of the bounds of this law.
Now the Conservative Offensive
51 M. Marcellus flogged a citizen of Novum Comum whose citizens had been granted citizenship by Caesar. He was challenging Caesar’s grant of citizenship. Cicero reports that Pompey was very upset by all of this. M. Marcellus moved to recall Caesar from Gaul. Mooted in the Spring, he could not move on this for months. There was no support. Then Marcellus moved that Caesar’s command end March 1, 50. Tribunes objected. Servius Sulpicius Rufus (other consul) opposed. Then there were a series of decrees. All of those decrees hostile to Caesar were vetoed by Tribunes. Pompey in all of this was trying to juggle his reentry into heart of aristocracy. If successful Pompey’s move would strengthen Caesar and himself. That the plan did not work does not mean that the plan did not exist.
Pompey was famous for his ambiguous replies to questions. His inimici tested for weakness in the alliance between Caesar and Pompey. He held to the side of Caesar. Now enter C. Scribonius Curio, tribune. He was angling for his own position of prominence. He was unpredictable and devious. Gruen challenges the view that Curio was bribed by Caesar. This is very complicated material. I suggest reading the relevant passages to understand the sequence. Curio was playing his own game. Caesar decided not to run in 50. Pompey now had a problem with the law he passed to exempt Caesar from professio and the right to run in absentia. These requests may have made it difficult for Pompey to deny propaganda of Cato/Marcellus that Caesar’s aims were limitless and unconstitutional. Now Curio sees chance to split Caesar from Pompey and attacks Pompey. Pompey’s complex alliances was making it more and more difficult to make choices. In all of this Pompey is pushed into statement which gave him less flexibility. Pompey when asked about the end of Caesar’s term, replied that it end in November of 50. Pompey hoped that this would give Caesar time to wrap matters up in Gaul and make his new alliances happy and content. Curio seeing matters slipping away renews attacks on Pompey and gives out that Caesar approved. Curio thus makes Pompey’s remark as an attack on Caesar. Marcellus plays into Curio’s hands. Curio was trying to detach Caesar from Pompey and Marcellus was trying to detach Pompey from Caesar. Marcellus miscalculated. The Senate voted to grant Caesar’s request for postponement to 49. Pompey was now in a pickle. He said that he would not support the extension. Now Senate does. He was isolated. It was at this time that Pompey became very ill. Gruen suggests it was psychosomatic. Curio in July proposes that both Pompey and Caesar dismiss armies. Senate votes 370 for and 22 against. But since Curio made the motion, Pompey did not trust. Marcellus and his group in a pickle too. This could mean an end to their influence. True for Pompey too. Marcellus rejects advice of Senate. Goes to pomerium and entrusted defense to Pompey. Pompey could not refuse. If he did he, would be completely abandoned. Perhaps this explains Pompey’s savage announcements. They came from a man in fear of disgrace. Ironically “the Pompeians needed civil war to preserve their preeminence.” January 10/11, Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Gruen does not think that there ever was a terminus date for Caesar’s command. It was common for the senate to assign someone until the job was done. The theory asserted by Pollio that Caesar had to go to war, because if he had returned to Rome a private citizen, his career would have ended in court. Gruen contests this vigorously. He doubts that with his resources, power, wealth Caesar, the conqueror of Gaul would have been convicted. Caesar himself said that he crossed the Rubicon to protect his dignitas. The concept of the collapse of the Republic is deceptive. That the fall of the Republic was desirable is also wrong. Civil War caused the fall of the Republic.
The most attesting feature of the late Republic is not lawlessness but an obsession with legalism. The war started over the bitter wrangling over Caesar’s ratio absentis (right to run for office in absentia) and its technical ramifications. When a crisis developed, it came not from revolutionary action but from a dispute about and divergence from traditional procedures. Convention mattered. They were themselves the agents of tension and conflict that finally engulfed Rome in civil war.
No comments:
Post a Comment