724. De Officiis III by Cicero. Cicero begins: Scipio was never less at leisure than when at leisure, never less alone than when he was alone. Cicero then points out that he rates Scipio above himself. It is a fine example of Cicero's modesty which some scholars conveniently overlook. As Cicero points out- Scipio's vacation time was voluntary, mine is not with the Senate abolished, trials extinguished. What for me is in the forum? Or in the Senate House? I am alone, while avoiding the wickedest.
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| Marcus Aurelius, Stoic philosopher |
Cicero makes it clear that the Roman habit of activity in a public setting is far preferable to literature composition. It seems that public activity does more to protect the state and improve its standing.
Cicero supplies an example of the need to set standards established by others- he does this in terms of his son.
Cicero discusses Panaetius' intention to cover the 3rd part of his discourse. Some wonder why Cicero is doing this when it is obvious that if the only good is moral goodness, how could anyone discuss conflict between expediency and moral goodness? But Cicero is not writing for philosophers but for those who have not achieved philosophical perfection. This is a great argument for Cicero, as this allows him to discuss important problems without the fetters of a perfect philosophical system. It also allows him to address a much larger audience.
Only the wise possess moral goodness. Those in whom wisdom has not been perfected do not have moral goodness. But these duties, the subject of this book, these duties called by the Stoics middle or mean duties are shared by all people and apply in countless situations. So in Cicero's view, for the purpose of what he is trying to do, in common discussion what seems perfected is enough.
Cicero then uses a great simile. In poetry or painting untrained people are delighted with art which should not be praised but do so because there is something of quality in it. But when educated these people realize their error. So, these topics are a second level moral goodness. But Cicero insists that all people possess an inborn goodness. These people are motivated by these duties. We may refer to Scipio as "brave", yet he was not brave in the perfect sense. Cato the Elder was called wise but only in the common sense because he practiced mean/middle duties consistently. And these mean/middle duties possessed the appearance of being wise.
Even though moral goodness never does battle with what is expedient nor must common moral goodness be compared with profit. So moral goodness in the common understanding must stand as a gage for common people in order to measure progress toward perfection. Those who measure everything by their advantage and refuse to give greater weight to moral goodness than what is expedient- these are not good people.
It is most base not only to think more of what is expedient than what is morally right but also it is most base to compare these (moral goodness and expediency) and to hesitate in the matter at hand.
What causes people to hesitate and to appear to be considered moral goodness? Sometimes there is doubt concerning a decision at hand. For it often happens what is considered to be base is found not to be so. E.g. Is it wrong to murder a tyrant, even one who is a friend? But the Roman people approve. Has expediency triumphed over moral goodness? No. Moral goodness has accompanied expediency.
We need a formula to deal with this: In this case we follow the Stoics who maintain that what is morally right is expedient and vice versa. Here is the LAW- to profit by taking from another is contrary to nature, worse than death, poverty, etc. For this destroys human association and bonds. To do this is to destroy the very foundations of Nature's Law.
He uses a parable of the human body. If each limb decided it would be best served by taking the health of the other limbs for itself, the whole body would perish. For each person to see to their own needs is fine as long as nature, the nature of humans, has no problems with this. But it is not permitted to plunder another in order to increase our own situation.
The bonds of humans must not be harmed. Punishment comes to those who attempt to dissolve this.
This law has been established by peoples everywhere.
-this is represented in human and divine law.
-in harmony with Nature- a loftiness of spirit, dignity of character, politeness, justice, generosity.
-not in harmony- pleasure, life for oneself, riches
It is in harmony with Nature to imitate Hercules who underwent great difficulties to serve mankind than live alone without trouble, piling up pleasures. A person is obedient to Nature who harms not another.
Anyone who thinks that it is not contrary to Nature to do wrong to another- what argument would there be with such a person who would utterly lift from a person what makes them human? If he thinks that death, poverty, etc. must be avoided, he makes a mistake in that personal damage is more serious than defects of character.
This is the main point: the interests of each person and the whole population is the same. The Law of Nature prescribes this: each person should see to the interests of another because that person is a fellow human, if so, it is necessary that in harmony with the same nature the shared advantage is of all.
Then we are contained by the same Law- it is forbidden for one person to harm another. What about those who think that fellow citizens must be regarded but foreigners? no. These destroy the common fabric of humanity. To violate common humanity is contrary to Nature and a violation of the Gods.
It is better to suffer personal damage or even to one's character than to harm another, as long as it is not in violation of Justice. Haec…una virtus omnium est domina et regina virtutum.=
This one virtue is the mistress and queen of all the virtues.
A tricky situation: is it ok for a wise person who is starving to take food from a loser? Answer: it is contrary to the Law of Nature for a wise person to deprive a loser of food.
What about someone who would provide valuable service to the Republic? It would be OK for someone to take from another to give it to a wise person. For it is contrary to Nature not to provide for the common interest.
There is no problem with the assassination of tyrants for their very being is contrary to Nature.
The proper route of duty is determined by the circumstances. When expediency in a deceptive form is met, we are effected. So when we notice that what appears to be expedient is not, but instead base we realize that where there is baseness, it certainly can not be expedient. Baseness is contrary to Nature.
The separation of expediency from moral goodness is the source of theft, crimes of all sorts. When judgement is false, profits dazzle the eyes, these suffer perhaps legal punishment but for sure severe damage to their own character.
We must be good even though no one may know. Cicero introduces the wonderful story of Gyges. He discovered a gape in the earth. He saw a bronze horse, found a ring and took it. He discovered that when he turned the ring, no one could see him. He used his invisibility to murder the king and take the Throne.
A good man would not see this as a means for wrong doing because the idea is not to escape notice but to seek what is right.
The story of Gyges forces someone to choose: either all things immoral should be avoided by people or these people are capable of criminal acts.
Moral goodness can not exist without advantage of expediency. He uses here the story of Brutus and Collatinus, the first consuls. We must balance our interests in terms of doing no harm to another.
How do we explain this apparent paradox?
Chrysippus' foot race: To work as hard as possible, to win and to seek what is needed for success is just fine, but it is wrong to take from another.
What about friendship? Apparent advantages such as honors, riches, pleasures should never come before friendship. But for example if someone is a judge and a friend is brought before that person into court, the person, the judge, sets aside that part of him who is a friend. When a judges renders a decision, God is present as witness, i.e.- his mind (conscience).
The famous story of Damon and Phintias- one volunteered to take place of the other condemned to death, to give time to settle affairs at home. I.E. the volunteer was willing to die, if the friend did not return. Moral goodness should prevail with friends over apparent expediency.
A business person ships grain to Rhodes. Rhodes is in a state of starvation. But the business person arrives knowing that other shipments are right behind him. Should he sell at the highest possible price or let Rhodians know about the ships soon to arrive and sell at a lower price?
Diogenes: Sell at as high a price as possible without breaking any laws or failing to tell of any faults associated with item sold.
Antipater: disclose everything so that buyer knows what the seller knows. The bonds of Nature between one person and another mean that nothing should be done to damage those bonds.
Many are convinced that certain situations are so expedient that it is almost wrong NOT to pursue it.
Cicero gives his view of the grain dealer. The dealer should disclose what is known. Not to disclose opens one up to criticism and a bad reputation- is that expedient?
Canius wanted to buy a house from Pythius. Pythius arranged it so that Canius would think that the property was a great investment. Canius paid the price and then discovered that it was not. This is called dolus malus= criminal fraud.
Gaius Aquillius offered a definition for criminal fraud: cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum= when one thing is pretended and another done. Pythius was not clever but used fraud to fleece another to line his own pockets at the expense of the bonds of society.
Are these ideals silly? Unheard of?
These ideals are reflected in the 12 Tables which offer protection for a tutela (guardianship), the cheating of minors is protected by Lex Plaetoria and in trials in general there is the legal expression: ex fide bona= in good faith ( a standard set by the way in which decent people live and operate), In the matter of a wife's dowry- melius aequius= the more fair, the better., in the case of the security of pledge- ut inter bonos bene agier= to act in the interests of someone as between good people.
Some are labelled as good, others as wise when people evaluate someone on the basis of seeing only to their own personal expediency in the common use of the word. It is ok to accumulate wealth for family, friends, etc. and the state without breaking any laws. No thanks is due to such thoughts for this can destroy the very thing which binds a state together.
It is never expedient to do wrong because THAT is immoral, it is always expedient to be a good person because THAT is always morally right.
Even our laws concerning the sale of property reflect this- as all faults known to the seller must be revealed. Tiberius Claudius Centumalus was told to take down part of his house by the Augurs. He immediately put it up for sale and, without telling, sold it to Publius Calpurnius Lanarius. Calpurnius finds out after the sale, knocks down part of his house and takes Tiberius to court. The judge was Cato, father of Cato the Younger. He ruled that since Tiberius knew and did not make it known, he was responsible to compensate Calpurnius for the loss.
The standards of Roman Law answer the dispute between Antipater and Diogenes.
C. Sergius Orata sold property with an encumbrance to Marcus Marius Gratidianus. Later Marius sold the same property back to Sergius. But said nothing of the encumbrance. Sergius takes Marius to court for failure to disclose. Crassus (teacher of Cicero) made the case for defense that the seller had to make good. Antonius (another teacher of Cicero) argued for equity. Cicero uses this as an example that law can not cover every conceivable contingency. In that case that is where equity (moral goodness) can compensate.
Where law is lacking, philosophy/morality picks up the slack with reason and understanding of the larger picture (intellegentia). What someone does may not be forbidden by custom, law or legal procedure but it may be by Natural Law.
Bona fide played a huge part as far as Q. Scaevola was concerned. He seemed to view it as the bridge between the limits of law in the sense that law can not cover all of the bases and between custom which may be flawed. Civil law guided by Natural Law punishes deception and trickery.
Nec ulla pernicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malkitia simulatio intellegentiae= and not any greater curse of life is able to be found than the appearance of conscience in ill will/bad behavior. From this comes the view that what is expedient comes into conflict with moral goodness. (Think of Cicero's simile of art and its appreciation.)
To separate expediency from moral goodness is the source of fraud, deception and of all wrong doing.
Cicero gives an interesting view of what it is to be a good person- it is a life time of countless duties and the recognition which goes with it. A good person would never do or say anything which he would not dare to say out loud. (A good person is someone who lives a lifetime of proper treatment of others.)
An example of separating expediency from goodness; a man wanted to have a powerful person as son in law by which he might gain more power for himself, no matter what damage it did to his country.
When someone does do wrong and is undetected- is it not the case that they are always worried that they will be discovered?
The Senate did not separate expediency from dignity when it honored Fabricius for returning the deserter to Pyrrhus. (The deserter told his Roman captives that he would murder Pyrrhus.)
Apparently expedient things are hostile to virtue. Malitia (cunning) desires to imitate wisdom and justice. Cunning has nothing to do with justice or wisdom as it by nature lack a sense of concealment and deception by their very nature.
What remains? Fortitude and Temperance.
Fortitude: Ulysses feigned insanity in order to keep his kingdom, be with his sons and family- must any honor in daily difficulties and dangers be compared with tranquility? What comments would Ulysses have heard?
Then Cicero uses the story of Regulus. He was captured in the 1st Punic war. He gave his oath to the Carthaginians that if he could not convince the Romans to exchange prisoners that he would return to Carthage. At the Senate meeting he argued that it was not expedient to return the captives as they were young and he was old. He made the motion to refuse the excnahge. When a call for vote was made, he refused to vote as he did not consider himself a Senator as long as he was under oath to the enemy. He carried the day. He returned to Carthage and was slowly killed by being forced to stay awake.
So we consider expediency to be in praise, decorum and moral goodness but the name of expediency we consider not splendid but necessary. The negative aspect of apparent expediency is attractive. But attractive to our own detriment.
Cicero takes on the common arguments used against the decision of Regulus:
1. Jupiter is accustomed neither to be angry or to do harm. In other words why would Jupiter take vengeance upon someone for breaking an oath? An oath has nothing to do with God's anger (of which there is none) but with justice and good faith. But not even in anger could Jupiter harm Regulus more than his own conscience.
2. Sometimes it is best to choose the lesser of two evils. So in this view Regulus should have figured that saving his own life and breaking his oath was less evil than returning to certain death. Is any evil greater than moral wrong? If someone chooses to think that there is no true oath with a faithless person- that person had better make sure that they are not actually looking for a loophole for perjury. Some think that an oath must not be kept with an enemy. But there is a difference between a legitimate enemy and say a pirate.
3. What if someone is forced to take an oath? How can a brave person be forced? He thought that it was not expedient for his country to break the oath or morally right for himself.
4. Something very expedient may turn out to be morally right. In Cicero's view "may" is no good. Nothing is expedient which is not morally good at the same time.
It is not morally right because it is expedient but expedient because it is morally right.
Temperance: Cicero rebuts that Epicureans could countenance restraint when they believe that pleasures are to be maximized. They may talk tough but we must follow their ideas to the clear conclusion. Pleasure and moral goodness are incompatible.
Pleasure we may assign to life as a seasoning but certainly it has not place in expediency which is so clearly connected with moral goodness.
The essence of Epicureanism has no room for restraint, justice, courage and truth, except in terms of what these can do to enhance pleasure. This means that each is expendable at any moment.
Cicero concludes with a touching farewell to his son.
